

Quantifying and minimizing risk of conflict in social networks

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Research Interest

- We are interested in *opinions* and *conflict* in *social networks*.

How do you form your opinions?

- Friedkin and Johnsen's opinion formation model.
- People have two different kinds of opinions:
 - internal opinions s
 - expressed opinions z


$$z_i = \frac{s_i + \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij} z_j}{1 + \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij}} \rightarrow z = (\mathbf{L} + \mathbf{I})^{-1} \mathbf{s}$$

Figure 1: Form opinions through social interactions with others with potentially differing opinions.

How to measure the conflict?

Name	Definition	\mathbf{s}
Internal Conflict: ic	$\sum_i (z_i - s_i)^2$	$\mathbf{s}^T (\mathbf{L} + \mathbf{I})^{-1} \mathbf{L}^2 (\mathbf{L} + \mathbf{I})^{-1} \mathbf{s}$
External Conflict: ec	$\sum_{(i,j) \in E} w_{ij} (z_i - z_j)^2$	$\mathbf{s}^T (\mathbf{L} + \mathbf{I})^{-1} \mathbf{L} (\mathbf{L} + \mathbf{I})^{-1} \mathbf{s}$
Controversy: c	$\sum_i z_i^2$	$\mathbf{s}^T (\mathbf{L} + \mathbf{I})^{-2} \mathbf{s}$
Resistance: r	$\sum_i s_i z_i$	$\mathbf{s}^T (\mathbf{L} + \mathbf{I})^{-1} \mathbf{s}$

Table 1: Measures for conflict in undirected networks



Conflict does not go away...

$$ic + 2ec + c = \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{s}$$

(A conservation law of conflict)

Challenges in existing work

- Getting \mathbf{s} is beyond reach in practice.
- Minimize the conflict on one issue may increase conflict on another.

Problem Definition

Given a social network $G = (V, E)$, how to minimize the conflict without knowing people's opinions? (i.e., without \mathbf{s})

Our approach:

Focus on **risk of conflict**, which is independent of any particular set of opinions, depending purely on the topology of the network.

Conflict Risk of a Network

- Average-case Conflict Risk (ACR) $(E[\mathbf{s}\mathbf{s}^T] = \mathbf{I})$

$$\text{ACR}_* = E[\mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{M}_* \mathbf{s}] = E[\text{trace}(\mathbf{s}\mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{M}_*)] = \text{trace}(E[\mathbf{s}\mathbf{s}^T] \mathbf{M}_*) = \text{trace}(\mathbf{M}_*)$$

- Worst-case Conflict Risk (WCR)

$$\text{WCR}_* = \max_{\mathbf{s} \in \{-1, 1\}^n} \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{M}_* \mathbf{s}$$

How to minimize the risk of conflict?

Optimization Problems

- Optimize ACR

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\mathbf{A}} \text{trace}(\mathbf{M}_*), \\ \text{s.t. } 0 \leq \mathbf{A} \leq 1, \\ \text{sum}(\text{sum}(\text{abs}(\mathbf{A} - \mathbf{A}_0))) \leq 2k. \end{aligned}$$

- Optimize WCR

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\mathbf{A}} \max_{\mathbf{s} \in \{-1, 1\}^n} \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{M}_* \mathbf{s}, \\ \text{s.t. } 0 \leq \mathbf{A} \leq 1, \\ \text{sum}(\text{sum}(\text{abs}(\mathbf{A} - \mathbf{A}_0))) \leq 2k, \end{aligned}$$

Conditional gradient descent versus Coordinate descent

- Conditional gradient descent: It seeks a step most aligned with the gradient, while respecting the constraints after taking a finite step along the direction.
- Coordinate descent: It takes the step on only one edge that leads to the largest decrease of the objective value.

Theoretical finding:

- Local optima for the ACR: complete (sub)graphs



$$\mathbf{s} \rightarrow \mathbf{S} \in \{-1, 1\}^{n \times \ell}$$

Consider a set of worst-case \mathbf{s} instead of just a single one.
More Robust.

Experimental findings:






Figure 2: Optimization for the ACR of external conflict ec on an Erdős-Rényi network ($n=50, p=0.03$) using conditional gradient descent with $k=2$.

External Conflict (ec), is arguably the most relevant among the conflict measures in practice, also exhibits the most complex behavior.


Interestingly, the structures at the local optima of the ACR for ec seem to correspond with **common management structures in companies**: a flat organization corresponds to a clique, while a hierarchical organization corresponds to a tree. Management practice may well have evolved this way in part because it minimizes conflict.




(a)



(b)




(c)




(d)


Figure 3: The ACR, WCR, and actual conflict for three internal opinion vectors over consecutive iterations with respect to ec . (a), (b) are based on an ER model ($n = 50, m = 60$) with conditional gradient descent $k = 1$; (c), (d) on Karate with coordinate descent.




(a) ACR = 8.4116



(b) ACR = 2.6315



(c) ACR = 2.6710



(d) ACR = 2.3308

Figure 4: Optimal results using the two algorithms for the ACR of ec . (a) is the original graph; (b) is the result of coordinate descent; (c) is the result of conditional gradient descent with $k = 5$ at each iteration; (d) is the result of conditional gradient descent with $k = 25$.

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References:

- [1] Noah E Friedkin and Eugene C Johnsen. 1990. Social influence and opinions. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 15, 3-4 (1990), 193-206.
- [2] Xi Chen, Jefrey Lijffijt, and Tijl De Bie. Quantifying and minimizing risk of conflict in social networks. Under review.

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